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Costs in the counterfeiting business 
Counterfeiting business costs depend on a variety of factors, which include the type of 
counterfeit products manufactured and their quality: Generally, the quality of counterfeit 
products varies. Counterfeit alcohol is a good example. In many cases it is suitable for sale 
in legal premises (e.g. corner shops and pubs), but in some other cases it has been found to 
be below the required strength. Most counterfeit alcohol poses no threat to consumers’ 
health, but in 2015 an investigation of a pub landlord in County Durham who was selling fake 
vodka showed that the alcohol contained dangerous ingredients ‘used to make antifreeze, 
disinfectant and fuel’ (cited in Lord et al. 2017). The issue here is that some commodities 
require significant financial investment in the production phase. For instance, making a 
quality counterfeit microchip (see Kelley, 2012) or a type of a pharmaceutical product (Hall 
and Antonopoulos, 2016) is more expensive obtaining something like counterfeit raw 
tobacco.  
 The Chinese sources were not short of examples that indicate the higher production 
costs of counterfeit goods made in the country. The process of manufacturing counterfeit 
perfume involves electric mixers, ingredients including industrial alcohol, fragrance essences 
and water, empty bottles and numerous kinds of packaging materials. It cost around 1.3 
yuan (£0.15) to make a bottle of fake ‘Lancôme’ perfume (China Anti-Counterfeiting Report, 
2016). Similar information on other high-profile cases (see for example Nanfang Metropolis 
Daily, 2015). In a recent incident detected in Nanjing (Yangtse Wanbao, 2017), copies of 
top-end cosmetics, such as La Mer, Jo Malone and CK (possibly also that handled by Julie, 
Matt and Christine in the Northeast of England as we saw earlier) were made in plastic 
buckets stored in a bathroom right next to the toilet, with limited expenses. Thus, the cost of 
faking a bottle of La Mer Moisturizing Cream could only be several tens of yuan (several 
pounds in sterling).   
By contrast, to make a highly imitated, known as 1:1, Louis Vuitton handbag can be 
‘costly’. Initial costs include several tens of thousands of yuan (several thousands of pounds) 
spent on learning techniques and know-hows to counterfeit bags. To imitate a top-brand bag 
involves purchasing a genuine product for around 15,000-25,000 yuan (approx. £1,700-
£2,900), taking it apart completely, making patterns and having different parts made by 
different specialist workshops, and finally assembling and packaging. For a ‘mature’ 
counterfeiting business, to ‘delicately’ copy, say, a Louis Vuitton Limited Edition Love Birds 
bag would cost around 1,300 yuan (approx. £150). However, making a ‘basic’ (quality) copy 
of Louis Vuitton handbag might cost just over 200 yuan (approx. £23) (Xinjing Bao, 2014).  
Our research suggests that illicit tobacco factories in Britain, which are specialise 
primarily in packing tobacco, do not require much investment to yield significant profits. 
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Some entrepreneurs set up their manufacturing business in disused venues. In a case we 
came across costs included £200-300 per month for the venue, £5,000 for raw tobacco, 
£1,000 for counterfeit packs and another £1,000 a month to have a couple of Chinese 
workers to put the tobacco in the packs. In another similar case, the counterfeiters, who set 
up a tobacco factory in Grimsby factory, bought the cigarette rolling machine from the 
internet (www.AliBaba.com) for £7,000 and paid only £25 per week for the venue. Before the 
HMRC intervened after only 3 weeks the entrepreneurs had made products that guaranteed 
profits of over £3,000,000 (interview with academic). 
Costs also depend on the scale of the project, its logistical complexity, and the 
level/position on the entrepreneur in the supply chain. The need for international transactions 
also significantly affects the business costs. Many small-scale entrepreneurs reduce costs 
by trading a small number of items, using internet platforms and/or operating their 
counterfeiting business from their household using spare rooms, garages and basements. 
The merchandise is stored in their cars, caravans or family members’ and friends’ houses. 
Other small-scale entrepreneurs do not have significant costs simply because their 
counterfeiting trade practices are unsophisticated and embedded in their normal life and 
work practices. ‘Dave’, for instance, often pays less than £1,000 for the watches. There are 
no accommodation costs because he stays with his wife’s family in China, and no 
transportation costs because the merchandise is small, light, and easy to carry. His flights 
from Manchester to Shanghai and back are paid for by the summer school in Shanghai 
(Interview with criminal entrepreneur #4). In some cases small-scale entrepreneurs reduce 
the costs of their businesses by sharing expenses with other entrepreneurs. For instance, a 
venue space divided by stud walls can accommodate 6-7 businesses trading, or a small part 
of warehouse can be used simultaneously by legal and illegal enterprises. In Manchester, 
some storage units used by counterfeiters are owned by the City Council (interview with 
National Trading Standards officer #2; interview with HMRC investigative officer).  
However, large-scale operations incur diverse, functional expenses that are 
unnecessary in small-scale operations. For instance, with no guarantee that a deal will be 
struck some counterfeiting entrepreneurs must pay for initial trips to meet with potential 
partners abroad. Large-scale means bulk, therefore it can be expensive to transport the 
merchandise, although these costs will vary according to the distance covered and the risk 
of seizures or arrests associated with specific UK entry points. However, it is possible for 
these transportation costs to be significantly different even when the distance covered and 
the possible risk are identical. For example, according to OLAF (2012), in two separate 
investigations in the UK, one driver received £1,000 per successful Channel crossing and 
the other £10,000. Costs associated with ‘cover loads’ during the transportation of 
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counterfeit products phase should be added (although it should be mentioned that most 
cover loads are very inexpensive commodities such as jelly, sand, cattle feed, rotten fruit, 
etc.). 
In large-scale schemes other functional costs include changing the merchandise in 
containers or moving it from one container to another at ports to confuse the authorities or 
divert their attention. An average amount paid for this activity is, according to an HMRC 
source, about £250 although it can vary depending on the value of the merchandise, and 
whether the criminal entrepreneurs have done business with the ‘movers’ before (Interview 
with HMRC investigative officer). In importation/wholesale cases, industrial units 
(warehouses) are rented to stash the merchandise. In the cases we came across these 
industrial units were rented for an average cost of about £50 per month (see also 
Antonopoulos and Hall, 2015). The security guards working in the premises were given small 
fees every month to watch and protect the particular units rented by the illegal 
entrepreneurs.  
 
“Wholesale is different. You might have to pay up to £10,000 to a lorry driver to 
transport the cigarettes from France or Belgium or wherever. You need to put the 
stuff in a warehouse, if you don’t want to keep it in your house. You need minders for 
the warehouse as you are never sure who knows about it and will try to steal it and 
so on” (Interview with customs intelligence officer).  
 
Large-scale entrepreneurs can also incur higher costs as they attempt to provide better 
quality counterfeits in an effort to beat competitors in localities in which counterfeiting thrives. 
One of the criminal entrepreneurs interviewed ensures high quality merchandise for his 
illegal business by mixing highly quality merchandise imported from abroad (Eastern Europe; 
merchandise manufactured in China and Malaysia) with legally produced merchandise. 
Occasionally, once every 3-4 months, they employ burglars to steal bulk quantities of 
merchandise from legal stores (e.g. H&M, Debenhams, Topshop etc.) and warehouses 
where garments are kept. Each entrepreneur employs burglars from their local community to 
commit burglaries outside the area in which their transportation companies are based. For 
every burglary the groups of burglars are paid 30% of the price of the stolen merchandise. 
The smallest amount paid to the burglars per heist is around £200 and the highest around 
£3,000, so the cost for this part of the business is roughly £600 - £9,000 per year. An 
additional cost is buying information about warehouses that contain legal merchandise. This 
information is bought for £200-300 per venue, irrespective of the quantity of merchandise in 
the premises. The stolen merchandise is sold along with the counterfeit imported items, 
which facilitates ‘counterfeit product laundering’ and establishes the entrepreneurs’ 
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reputation as merchants of quality ‘fake’ clothes. This quality differentiation is essential if the 
entrepreneur is to ward off competition from other entrepreneurs operating in the area 
(interview with criminal entrepreneur #5). 
Finally, functional costs include payment to other actors in the counterfeiting 
business. In our study, we came across payments to couriers, individuals who are trusted 
with transporting merchandise and/or money. Antonopoulos and Hall (2015) refer to a case 
of transportation of £1,000,000 illicit tobacco money from the North of England to someone 
in London. The courier received £5,000 for the service, or 0.5% of the money transported. 
On some occasions legitimate courier companies are used. In September 2014, for instance, 
three tobacco counterfeiters from the West Midlands were sentenced for their involvement in 
a counterfeit tobacco smuggling ring. The counterfeiters were arrested by the HMRC who 
also seized more than nine tonnes of raw tobacco smuggled in Chinese tea boxes. A search 
of one of the entrepreneur’s home address revealed paperwork showing payments made to 
legitimate courier firms (HMRC, 2014). 
Payments are also made to so-called minders, people with physical capital who often 
accompany the money couriers. Unlike couriers, the minders are subcontracted on an ad 
hoc basis and paid a standard fee per job. Payments must also be made to retail sellers who 
have not invested in a small-scale counterfeiting scheme but work for someone else. Their 
daily fee ranges between £20-£100 (Interview with National Trading Standards officer #2; 
Antonopoulos and Hall, 2015). The payments to actors involved in the counterfeiting 
business can vary widely, depending on their role and the size and scope of the operation, 
as well as the personal relationship between the entrepreneur and the actor. For example, in 
one of the cases we came across, the entrepreneur used his teenage daughter as his inner-
town money courier and did not pay a fee. 
Other business costs include contingency expenses mostly associated with the risks 
of losing the merchandise or being found out by the authorities. Although these critical 
moments can also be experienced by small-scale entrepreneurs, it is mostly large-scale 
entrepreneurs who tend to incur these costs. For instance, when customs officers find that 
cargo manifest is not in accordance with the recorded load, merchandise is confiscated. The 
HMRC have also come across cases involving batches of counterfeit products (mostly 
cigarettes and clothes) stolen from warehouses, although the HMRC suggested that the 
thefts might have been carried out by competitors. Other contingency costs include those 
related to seizures of vehicles and legal advice following arrests of criminal entrepreneurs 
and their associates:  
 
“The police stopped a van 10 miles from Leeds for a broken windscreen. The officer 
does a check at the back and he thinks there is something dodgy going on. So, he 
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gives us [HMRC] a call and says ‘you might want to take a look at this’. No 
paperwork….Turns out it is fake luxury handbags from China” (interview with HMRC 
investigative officer).   
  
Finally, costs depend on the embeddedness of the counterfeiting scheme in a legal 
business: Generally, large-scale entrepreneurs who operate within the confines of their legal 
businesses tend to absorb some of the costs relating to their illegal businesses and the risks 
associated with them. For example, transportations/logistic companies do not pay for 
transportation expenses since this is embedded in their everyday business. In addition, they 
do not have to mobilise human resources for their illegal business. For instance, they do not 
have to pay workers and drivers, who already work in their legal transportation business and 
are often unaware of the illegal business taking place: 
 
“Nothing, they [drivers] always know fuck all, so they get the load and they deliver it 
to where they’re told and they get about two thousand quid… and then you’ve got the 
man let’s say the hinge-pin over there and he’s the one putting the money in anyway, 
and he’ll have contributions from his other pals who help the hinge-pin accumulate 
the money so they’ll have their costs with running about, distributing, sorting the lorry 
out and what have you. I don’t know how much they’ve got involved over there but I 
was always told the driver never knew. So, I never asked questions, I only wanted to 
know what I want to know that’s it…” (Interview with criminal entrepreneur #2).  
 
In addition, some counterfeiting entrepreneurs who own legal businesses, such as 
interviewee #5, and who get involved in large-scale counterfeiting schemes, have a diverse 
portfolio (counterfeit tobacco, counterfeit clothes and previously counterfeit alcohol) while 
operating from a single legal premises. Moreover, international connections and larger 
investment capability allow them to buy in bulk and get better prices from manufacturers, 
which creates an economy of scale and a general reduction of overheads. More successful 
entrepreneurs – and these generally tend to be legal businesspeople – whose initial 
investments tend to more substantial, are able to place ‘call-off’ orders. This basically means 
that they order a substantial quantity of the merchandise from a producer and take 
advantage of the usual discount that exists per single item ordered and arrange for the 
merchandise to be sent in installments to cover demand (Interview with forensic accountant). 
 
Profits and investments in the counterfeiting business  
The profit margin in the counterfeiting trade in the UK depends on a number of variables. 
First, whether the entrepreneurs operate within primary or secondary markets. According to 
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OECD/EUIPO (2016), there are two market segments that counterfeiters target: 1) primary 
markets, in which prices are expected to be close to those of the corresponding products 
sold in the legitimate market and in which customers are deceived about whether the 
product is genuine; and 2) secondary markets, which involve significant price ranges and 
customers are expected to pay a much lower price than for the genuine products. 
Entrepreneurs involved in primary markets tend to make the highest profits, although precise 
product pricing is a dynamic process in which the counterfeiter uses his/her ‘entrepreneurial 
judgement’ (Dean et al., 2010). The art of judgment must take into account the level of 
demand for a product and the market potential; the quality of the counterfeited merchandise; 
the area of sales; the type of clientele and its buying power; competition by other similar 
entrepreneurs; and the relationship between lowering/reducing prices and the point of 
maximum profits (see Hotelling, 1929).  
Second, profit margins depend on the position of the illegal entrepreneurs in the 
supply chain. The profits begin to reduce as the merchandise moves down the supply chain. 
Actors in the retail market will make the smallest profit. This is because retailers rely on 
wholesalers/importers – either by working for them or by buying products from them – and a 
significant portion of the overall profit is absorbed by actors in this sector of the business. 
This was observed at Manchester’s Cheetham Hill market where two entrepreneurs spoke of 
the relatively insignificant role they play as retailers in the supply chain, and of the smaller 
profits they make as a result: 
 
“I’m a nobody. These markets are linked to larger networks in Turkey and China” 
(criminal entrepreneur #6).  
 
“The sunglasses are usually £7 but our supplier did us a deal to buy bulk. We still 
only make £1 per pair if we sell them for £5” (criminal entrepreneur #7). 
 
Sometimes the small profit is the result of the retail part of the chain having been 
extended by ‘consumer-retailers’, a process which adds layers in the price of the 
merchandise: 
 
“When you have a small box, it is most likely going to be resold. Let us say that a box 
contains 100 lipsticks, sold at a price of £3 each. These will be resold many times 
and every time, the price will be higher. So the closer you are to the person that 
receives the package, the lower the price. If you, as the initial customer, buy 10, you 
pay £30 pounds and then you sell them to your lady friends for £5 each, which is still 
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a good price and you make £20. Now one of your lady friends might sell a couple for 
£10 each also making a few pounds…” (interview with HMRC officer).  
 
Manufacturers and original suppliers also tend to make relatively low profits. The Chinese 
literature suggests that often local manufacturers of counterfeit goods may only achieve a 
2% profit margin from selling their products to overseas importers. The only way to make 
more is to sell bulk whilst the traders abroad make the highest profits on all amounts  (Zhao 
and Xu, 2013). Third, profits depend upon relationships between associated 
businesses/entrepreneurs in a locality. If business is stable and not severely affected by 
competition, higher prices can be maintained and the entrepreneurs’ return guaranteed 
(interview with Intellectual Property Office official).  
Fourth, accessibility of illegal retailers to customers is an important variable. The use 
of legal outlets to sell counterfeit products – such as ‘Christine’s’ salon mentioned earlier, or 
pubs where locals attend and networks are established – seems to increase sales. As ‘Dave’ 
noted with regards to his counterfeit watch scheme, within his stable network, “30 watches 
are sold just like that…” (Flicks fingers) (Interview with criminal entrepreneur #4). In such 
outlet networks marketing/promotion occurs organically via word of mouth as the actors’ 
status and reputation within specific locales alerts potential customers to the availability of 
the merchandise. The longer a counterfeiting operation is in existence, the less the need for 
advertising, as existing customers not only return but inform new customers by word of 
mouth. Within this context, sometimes merchandise is sold at a ‘discount’ or even given free 
to selected individuals from the entrepreneur’s social circle. ‘Dave’ considers the discounted 
and/or free watches as “promotional expenses. People might see the watch on one’s hand 
and ask ‘where did you get this from? I want one. It’s good for business and it costs nothing, 
really” (Interview with criminal Entrepreneur #4). Occasionally, the discount is created by the 
entrepreneur by suggesting an initial high price for the item (relatively close to the price of 
the item in the legal market) and then lowering the price significantly. This incurs no cost to 
the entrepreneur since the initial high price is artificially inflated and does not correspond to 
the cost of procurement. It also signals product quality, which attracts more buyers. 
Marketing research has shown that most consumers think they are buying a better product 
when they see an initial high price discounted (see Bagwell and Riordan, 1991). Criminal 
entrepreneurs also sell their merchandise in car boot sales, and increasingly advertise their 
products on Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp or Instagram in an effort to expand the circle of 
potential customers. The internet and social media not only constitute a ‘convergence 
setting’ (Soudijn and Zegers, 2012) for criminal entrepreneurs involved in various part of the 
supply chain products, but also facilitate the exchange of information among potential 
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customers (Interview with economist at the OECD), and the sales of various commodities to 
a much broader pool of customers locally, nationally and internationally. 
 
“The internet is a formidable market opportunity also for counterfeiters. They use it – 
there is no doubt about that – but there you have different levels. Some of these 
internet sites, as some of the investigators say, sometimes they’re even more 
beautiful than the true ones. They sell the products, and sometimes at quite high 
prices. They then say, ‘We will give you a 10% discount,’ something like that, and 
their products are sometimes really of high quality” (Interview with member of 
EUIPO). 
 
Finally, profits depend on the time of the year of the sales. Business and corresponding 
profits increase significantly at specific times of the year such as summer and Christmas: 
“Gets busier at Christmas because there’s a lot more than of the general public that tend to 
go down there…” (Interview with National Trading Standards officer #2).  
 
Spending and investing profits from counterfeiting 
How counterfeiting money is spent and/or invested naturally depends on the profits but also 
the social microcosm of the entrepreneurs and the opportunities it offers (von Lampe, 2007), 
as well as the entrepreneur’s values and priorities. To return to the kind of money involved  
we can see in how the profits of counterfeiting are spent the hallmarks of ‘special monies’.  
That is despite how ‘modern money seems starkly homogenous … Yet camouflaged by the 
physical anonymity of our dollar bills, modern money is also routinely differentiated, and not 
just by varying quantities but also by its special diverse qualities. We assign different 
meanings and designate separate uses for different kinds of monies’ (Zelizer 1989: 342-
343). In many households money from different sources is designated for different purposes 
– be that reserving gifted money for special purchases, or creating separate funds for 
particular kinds of discretionary spending, such as an allowance for a hobby. In the same 
manner money derived from counterfeiting is often not simply treated the same as all other 
monies available. Counterfeit trading is often linked to providing the funds for different forms 
of expenditure, and thus to satisfying specific wants and desires than simply making money 
for money’s sake. It is money with a purpose. We have identified four types of counterfeiting 
money spending/investing, although in many instances there are overlaps between and 
among different types: 
Survivalist spending: This is spending the proceeds of small-scale entrepreneurship 
on essential commodities and services. The entrepreneurs who engage in this type of 
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spending are far away from the ‘organised criminal’ stereotype. Many engage in the 
counterfeiting business to supplement benefits and/or low wages.   
Impulsive/chaotic spending: Profits from the counterfeiting business are often spent 
on lifestyle consumption, including luxuries (such as jewellery, antiques, cocaine, expensive 
cars with high running costs) that allow the conspicuous display of the counterfeiters’ 
success and personal wealth (see Hall et al., 2008): “quite funnily, they [counterfeiters] stick 
to the areas they come from, disadvantaged areas, and drive expensive cars… and they 
wonder why people snitch” (Interview with HMRC investigative officer). Ironically, the first 
thing ‘Dave’ bought with the money from his first importation of fake watches was a real TAG 
Heuer Carrera from a major jeweller’s chain in the UK: “I could not live with myself knowing 
that I wear a fake watch”. Other purchases include expensive furniture: “We can now say, 
‘let’s go and buy this handmade coffee table or a dining table with 10 chairs, not six! We 
even got a king size bed without looking at the price” (Interview with criminal entrepreneur 
#4). Money is also spent on expensive holidays abroad: “Some people [counterfeiters] on 
Facebook it’s like they’re celebrities. Oh God, you’re in the Maldives again?” (Interview with 
investigator in private company) (see also Junninen, 2006). In one case which involved the 
importation of six metric tonnes of raw tobacco in hundreds of parcels from Belgium and the 
Netherlands to the UK, a criminal entrepreneur spent £1.1 million at betting shops in a single 
year (The Gazette, 2016). The couple travelling to South East Asia spend their profits on the 
next trip; a rolling investment and return process that pays for their holidays. 
Family-oriented spending/investment: Unlike those entrepreneurs who are mostly 
young with limited social responsibilities and prefer to spend their profits on hedonistic 
pursuits (see Hall et al., 2008), some entrepreneurs pay off their own and their (extended) 
family members’ debts and mortgages. Others in this category buy or renovate houses and 
other properties in the UK and abroad (Ireland, Spain or the entrepreneur’s country of origin 
for minority ethnic entrepreneurs) and/or invest in their children’s’ education. Family-oriented 
spending/investment is usually modest, and in these cases entrepreneurs are careful to 
make sure that it does not extend too far beyond their legal income, thus avoiding too much 
attention (see also van Duyne and Levi, 2005; Skinnari, 2010). 
Business-oriented investment: Types of business investment are linked to the 
individual actors’ own contacts and networks and areas of previous experience and 
knowledge (see also L’Hoiry, 2013). For example, we came across an entrepreneur with an 
existing job in the food supply chain who sought to expand his business using profits from 
his illicit tobacco business. Actors are typically restricted to investing in areas in which they 
have some prior experience and expertise. 
However, the counterfeiting business itself is also a common target for reinvestment. 
From the initial moment a scheme becomes successful, part of the profit is invested in 
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subsequent schemes and occasionally – especially in the case of owners of legal 
businesses – towards expanding and/or diversifying (see also previous section). Some 
criminal entrepreneurs, especially those who are sole entrepreneurs or do not own a legal 
business that acts as a platform for their counterfeiting business, carefully consider the 
‘profit-risk’ ratio of their business (see Dean et al., 2010). They deliberately re-invest 
relatively small amounts of money (£1000) and do not wish to expand but simply maintain a 
low volume-high value scheme because of the logistical complexities and risks involved in 
expansion or diversification; mostly financial risks that they do not have the capacity to 
absorb should something go wrong:  
 
“Imagine if I brought over 100 watches… I would need a suitcase at least, and what 
would happen, if they are seized at the border? Exactly… my money is gone…” 
(Interview with criminal entrepreneur #4). 
 
Similarly, those entrepreneurs with an online component to their business re-invest small 
amounts from their initial profits in order to maintain a low profile on specific online platforms:  
 
“You just start off with one batch and then you build it up and build it up, but the 
problem you’ve got then is if you’re on eBay, eBay will make you become a trader so 
you will have to put information about yourself on there so you’d have to hide there, 
so there are obstacles that you’ve got to overcome and you’ve just got to hope that… 
we’re not watching. So that’s another way of doing it, it’s the investment is quite 
small” (Interview with National Trading Standards officer #3). 
 
Business-oriented investors involve criminal business-oriented investors. Although the usual 
route is for criminals to invest profits from other criminal business into counterfeiting because 
of the relatively lower risks involved, in one interesting case provided by the HMRC 
investigative officer we interviewed a couple invested their profits from counterfeiting and 
other business activities in the construction of a hotel in Pakistan. It was used as a 
recruitment and transit point for individuals who were to be trafficked into the UK for labour 
exploitation:  
 
"We had information about a British Pakistani couple in Bradford. They were owners 
of a relatively big clothes company in Bradford and our intelligence suggested they 
were involved in counterfeiting. Clothes, bags, belts, you name it. We raided the 
premises in this area full of warehouses, and we started searching for money, 
products, documents. People were also working illegally in the business. One of my 
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colleagues noticed a poster of a big building on the wall. Looked like a big house 
abroad but the thing is that this house was in bigger and smaller frames in their 
house too... In the living room, in the office, in the kitchen. Our investigation revealed 
that this building was in fact a hotel that was built with money from the counterfeiting 
business and it was used as a recruiting and harbouring venue for trafficked persons 
from Asia, mostly Pakistan. After the came to the UK, they would work in the clothes 
company, in restaurants..." (Interview with HMRC investigative officer). 
 
